On the Nature of Belief

Acquisition and Loss of Belief

Belief Acquisition During Human Development

As the belief sets of young children are very different from that of mature adults, belief would seem to be modified by our development within the world. Our understanding of belief needs to be consistent the nature of human developmental biology and developmental psychology.

It would seem sensible to presume that the neonate has no learned belief and that that process of biological development, learning and socialisation is accompanied by the acquisition of beliefs. Would the entire non-linguistic belief set of a very young baby be equivalent to "when I have a hunger sensation and turn to the soft warm part of my mother and begin to suckle my feelings of hunger will ease". Again it seems sensible to presume that the development of motor skills and verbal and non-verbal communication in the infant is associated with the development of an ever more complex belief set.

Beliefs as defined here are probably not uniquely human constructs. Judging from their behaviour, beliefs would appear to be held by many animals, albeit in a less sophisticated form. Common chimpanzees and bonobos are an obvious candidate example of a believing animal, if such exists, for they seem to show resourcefulness and a range of meaning in communication with each other ( see source). Chimpanzees for example are also said to have excellent mental maps ( see source). Wider study of animal development would therefore seem to offer the possibility of enriching our understanding of how belief develops. If nothing else, such study should deflate the exaggerated claims of human uniqueness that many hold to.

Belief Loss though Disease

If belief is acquired through development it seems rational to suggest that beliefs could be lost through brain trauma or disease processes. What belief set is a person capable of holding in the late stages of dementia? Little would seem to be the obvious answer. They appear to loose understanding of the world around them and even an understanding of themselves and their own body functions. If belief can be acquired in development it would certainly seem to be lost in chronic neurological degeneration.

In maters of disease we could perhaps derive more specific insights by understanding the effects of specific neurological deficits on our abstract beliefs. By considering the problems encountered by neurologists in patients, such as those described in accounts like 'The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat', we can perhaps gain insights into the nature of how belief can be lost in areal sense.