contact@onbelief.orgDefinitions of Belief
Definition of Belief Used Here
When the word belief is used on this site it is taken to mean idea in its most general sense. Some ideas can be regarded as factual (see below) while others may be regarded as having a probabilistic degree of certainty. Beliefs can also be treated in practice as if they were false or wrong in a logical sense. Nevertheless, the absolute truth of falseness of many or even most descriptive beliefs is regarded as indeterminate.
Algorithmic and Computational Perspectives on Belief
There are at least 2 empirical levels at which we can analyse and define belief. At one level we can ask how the nuts and bolts of brain function work. By this method we try to determine how beliefs are computed and understand the biological constraints of belief formation in our own and other species. Similarly the neurologist can try to figure out what is happening in the mind of the diseased or injured brain of her patients. The neuroscientist can report what different parts of the brain do and how they communicate. In other words a classic reductionist approach is employed.
The other way to proceed is to examine what belief is at a more abstract or cognitive level where we look at the emergent properties of the brain as a complex organ and largely concern ourselves with the nature of the decisions reached. Little or no consideration is then given to the computational mechanism of the brain only to the results of computation. By examining the results we then infer something about their effects on individuals and therefore the world at large. In so doing we can and produce more abstract algorithmic schemes about how beliefs come to be formed. In this second approach is the domain of the logician, ethicist and clinical psychologist.
The modern psychiatrist attempts to span both domains by crudely interfering with brain chemistry using psychoactive drugs and at the same time examines the patient's reported thoughts, apparent well being and behaviour to understand something of the dysfunctional beliefs that could be usefully modified.
Each of these approaches have value. Our state of ignorance is such that it is a matter of individual preference as to which approach is used for there is much to be discovered before we can link sensory perception and the abstract more intangible cognitive functions of the brain and products of consciousness. Even if a very comprehensive and integrated description of brain function is arrived at one day, it will still be convenient to consider belief at different levels of analysis for at least some of the emergent properties of the system will not be readily understood at the level of neuronal communication.
Definition of Descriptive Factual Belief
Some refer to factual beliefs as observations or events. The definition of descriptive factual belief used in these pages is 1) a belief based on repeated (or repeatable) observations that directly support a descriptive proposition about the state of the world or 2) a belief based on a variety of repeatable dissimilar observation which when taken together support a descriptive proposition of the world. A fact is regarded as having near-to or absolute certainty for all practical purposes. No distinction is made between absolute and near-to-absolute certainty as no rational person will change their actions because of the theoretical difference. Factual descriptive beliefs are used as 'the fact's for calculation of Bayesian probabilities relating to predicted outcome of repeated events.
Examples of factual belief:
1) The sun will 'rise' tomorrow morning.
In this example we are making useful application of the propensity theory of probability and the 'laws' of gravitation. From the scientific perspective there is of necessity many underlying assumptions that require experimental test so that the 'fact' of the sun's 'rising' tomorrow morning has experimentally verifiable theoretical support, in addition to the underlying observation. In theoretical terms there needs to be, for example, a measurable universal gravitational constant in both Newtonian and relativistic physics. We do not however need to be aware of the theoretical requirement of a gravitational constant to 'know' that the sun will 'rise' tomorrow. To construct a more generalisable belief such as 'the sun will 'rise' for the next 5 billion years' we do require the logical coherence of many descriptive propositions. [It is of course worth reiterating what one respondent has pointed out. We know the sun does not actually 'rise' except in relation to the horizon.]
2) A bullet penetrating through the centre of my heart that has been fired at close range from a .44 Magnum revolver will definitely kill me in the absence of emergency medical help.
In this example, we do not need to invoke conservation of mass-energy as the blood spills from the cardiovascular system of the heart and lungs to cause death. The 17th century observations of William Harvey are of themselves sufficient without recourse to very generalisable descriptive propositions.
The concept of a factual belief can be extended by logical beliefs.
Delusional beliefs
On this site delusions are held to be series of 2 or more inaccurate descriptive beliefs that cannot have a logically true relationship but are thought to have that property by the holder. Delusion by this definition can arise by ignorance as well as dysfunctional logic.
Examples of delusional beliefs by the definition used on this site: My sister is Napoleon's daughter. The moon is a star.
By the definition used here delusion could be shared by two or more people or even an entire community. Note that this definition is different from the social definition of delusion which means that psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, neurologists and social workers are not expected to 'treat' communally held delusions. A medical definition of delusion also requires a social component as we can see from a paper in British Medical Journal. "Delusion: false, unshakeable belief out of keeping with the patient's educational, cultural, and social background; it is held with extraordinary conviction and subjective certainty" ( see source paper). Although that definition is extremely useful for the medical practitioner it is inadequate from a more general perspective.
Suspension of Disbelief
Suspension of disbelief is worthy of definition because of it cultural importance. The definitions used on this site are 1) A "willingness of a person to accept as true the premises of a work of fiction, even if they are fantastic or impossible" (see source) 2) A disregard for the value of either old or new evidence 3) A deliberate decision to accept, at least temporarily, beliefs that run counter to other beliefs held by the same individual. 4) A 'thought experiment' that runs contrary to well established hypothesis.
Example:1 ) Torture is morally wrong but should be governed by statue if used lightly in extremis. [see: Even torture should be subject to the rule of law] 2) Although killing in civil society is wrong in war it is permissible. 3) Belief that the world was created around 6000 BC despite scientific observations consistent with great age (see Age of the earth). 4) In the TV series Star Trek, Mr Spock can be bodily transported on a beam and the star ship USS enterprise can travel at speeds greater than light speed by 'warping' the space-time continuum using a 'warp engine'. 5) Special relativity tells us that if you saw a bus and its passengers traveling past you at close to the speed of light they would be horizontally contracted. (In this case the suspension refers to buses, people and sight.)
Can beliefs be algorithmically categorised?
It is common for us to describe beliefs as scientific, religious, moral, political, legal, social, cultural, economic, historical or attribute to them some other category for the purposes of intellectual analysis and study. It is interesting to consider whether or not we can categorise beliefs at a more fundamental intellectual level that might inform our philosophy. We could for example regard all belief as having a similar basis either in physical or algorithmic terms (see next paragraph). Alternatively, interlinked categories of idea, or belief, might be distinguished if we were to use an algorithmic approach to thinking and perhaps ignore its neurological basis. By this approach we might consider that beliefs could be usefully categorised in an introspectively logical fashion.
This type of approach has been pejoratively labeled folk-psychology by some philosophers. Whether this is folk-psychology or not is an irrelevance. The question is merely whether or not belief categorisation is useful at some level of analysis given the state of our knowledge. It matters little whether or not there is a distinct physical basis for this categorisation provided it has predictive power at some level of analysis.
A one-way categorisation:
Even beliefs that describe the world might be said to have a logical component. Take the descriptive belief 'The flower is dark red'. By this form of analysis it could be said that the descriptions 'dark red' and 'flower' are being 'logically' compared to two observational standards within the memory' of the observer. If understanding of the external world arises by pattern recognition, as some propose, it would perhaps be more productive to regard all sensory perception and its cognitive derivatives as logical. Even esthetic beliefs (or personal preferences) would then seen as a form of logic. This way of thinking is elaborated in the next page where belief is examined more from a computational perspective.
A three way categorisation:
Descriptive, esthetic and logical beliefs could be held to exist at one level of algorithmic analysis. Such categories are identified as they seem to fit well with every day experience. Whether or not they exist is a neurologically distinct fashion or involve different physiological processes or anatomical structure is a philosophical irrelevance.
Descriptive beliefs are held to be cognitive, linguistic or mathematical formulations of the way things are sensed after observation and construed with reference to memory. Descriptive beliefs could be equivalent to the computational product of cognition of sensory input to our brain and recall of memory. At a practical level they could also be historical or predictive ideas, or be specific to one instance or be more generalisable. Mathematics is regarded as a form of descriptive language with its own meaning, logic or axioms.
No distinction is made between observation, in the sense of perception directly available to consciousness (or qualia) and short-term memory. Alternatively beliefs may be purely derived from long-term memory. (For more articles on memory see Memory, Visual Short-Term Memory, Working memory in Wikipedia.) No belief is held to exist in isolation but instead be the product of different types of sensory input to different cognitive centres in the brain. By this definition the more inter-related memories we have the more sophisticated our beliefs can be. A loss of memory could by that definition result in a loss of belief. Descriptive beliefs could, for example, have scientific, religious, social, or economic content.
Examples of descriptive beliefs: Life was brought to earth on meteorites. Spaghetti is long, thin and cylindrical. Jesus was born in the year 4 AD. Tomorrow it will rain. The gravitational constant = 6.67x 10 -11 m 3 kg -1 s -2.
Esthetic beliefs are statements of emotion or preference that are secondary to descriptive beliefs and cannot be independent of descriptive beliefs. Moral beliefs are a special subset of esthetic beliefs that describe how interaction should be between humans or between humans and other living things.
Examples of esthetic beliefs: Scientific ideas have intellectual beauty. Allah is great. Pink furniture is in bad taste. The pope is a very spiritual person.Logical beliefs could be defined as propositions dealing with the relationship between descriptive or esthetic beliefs. The distinction between the concepts of inductive and deductive reasoning is not regarded as very helpful when understanding the nature of belief. Abductive reasoning is perhaps a more useful general concept. Beliefs are better regarded as either specific or general, certain (true or false) or probabilistic. Individual numbers are regarded as descriptive propositions that have logical relationships with one another. Similarly a mathematical vector is regarded as descriptive but a vector sum as logical proposition with a descriptive result. An integral or a derivative is, like a vector sum, a description that has a logical basis. A set is regarded as a logical construct or belief.
Examples of the moral belief subset: I should feed the poor and starving. Surgical termination of pregnancy is wrong. Murderers should be hanged. Every adult has the right to carry guns. I should not spoil the planet for other creatures.Examples of logical beliefs in the context of descriptive or esthetic beliefs : 1+1=2.
All men are liars. I am a man. Given that each of these descriptive propositions are true I am a liar. (a syllogism)
I do not like flowers. A rose is a flower. Given that those esthetic and descriptive beliefs are true I do not like roses.
On the Nature of Belief
www.onbelief.org
Scotland, 12th October 2007 and thereafter
Copyright 2007 onwards
