On the Nature of Belief

Comments on 'Truth', Pragmatic Relativism, and Rejection of Cultural Truth 'Norms'

Cultural 'Truths'

If we are fortunate to live in a society which shuns social, political and religious authoritarianism we become freer to investigate in a practical and intellectual sense the ideas that are crucial for our well being. We might then, for example, wish to understand the ethical values that underpin our democracy. I would argue that we should also understand something of the philosophy and modus operandi of our sciences and technologies for they play a very considerable if not predominant role in the way which we lead our lives. We can go further than merely aping the methods of science and adopt the underlying presumption of the need for enquiry. In doing so we will come to a point where there becomes a need to weigh the value of one idea against another. If we fail to test the relative value of ideas we risk being defined by acceptance of current 'truths' in a way that is unnecessarily limiting.

Although it becomes important to decide on how ideas may be tested, in the first instance we need to address the question of whether or not an idea is testable. For the pragmatist a testable idea (or theory), is worth more than any assertion of truthfulness that does not have an observational basis or cannot be meaningfully questioned. We should not of course be under the illusion than any tests we devise are in anyway absolute. We can merely hope that they are internally consistent to our present frame of reference. If an idea appears to be wrong, based on new or more elaborate observations or emerging logical inconsistencies, or seems of little value in a practical sense we can move on to something more productive and of greater explanatory power. Engineers for example do not appear to have a need for references to metaphysics. If the idea appears truthful we can exploit it's utility until doing so becomes problematic or better ideas present themselves to us.

Some philosophers and commentators have spun the delusional idea that there is "more than one way to know". This could then logically lead to different class of truths. I am of the opinion that there is not more than one way to know merely different forms of evidence which we need to weigh against each other after observation of the world.

I have an older book on philosophy which nonsensically states that ideas have emerged by 'pure reason'. To counter this irrationality consider the existence of a person endowed with a brain of unparalleled abilities. However that person due to an accident of birth has no sense of touch, taste, heat detection, hearing or site and is merely able to eat when force fed, breath, pass urine and defecate. Tell me now what that super reasoning brain could know? All ideas are ultimately, although perhaps very indirectly the product of sensory input. Some will of course have more utility than others or present us with greater satisfaction.

Pragmatic Relativism

Rather than cling to unsubstantiatable claims of truth we should value a form of pragmatic relativism, which does not assert that all ideas have equal validity, utility or power to satisfy but instead stresses the utilitarian value, importance and emotional rewards of the ideas to which we presently adhere. Rather than be over-concerned with very abstract ideas, important 'truths', guiding principles, or natural laws perhaps our personal and social philosophy should be more concerned with the importance of our present existence and the maximisation of aspects of life that we consider personally important or worth striving for. Essentially this is the practice of engineers, doctors, judges, scientists and many politicians in their professional lives. Such an approach gives personal satisfaction and a sense of purpose to the practitioner; like the scientific researcher for example.

If we become absorbed in ideas of truth we can be diverted into an analysis of meaning and an almost worthless focus on the indeterminacy of meaning in both a linguistic and mathematical sense and could develop unnecessary concerns about the difference between the 'analytic' and the 'synthetic' as articulated by Quine (see Two Dogmas of Empiricism).

There are of course philosophers and theologians who see relativism as self-contradictory, internally inconsistent or logically incomplete ( see one example) and cling to the position that truth or at least a method of arriving at truth is necessary or desirable. As relativists we should instead replace the concept of desirability with satisfaction and be content with our own logical incompleteness.

We can at least attempt to distinguish ideas derived by the so called 'scientific methods' of observation, explanation and testable prediction from those of traditional practice as one way to examine the relative value of belief sets. In so doing we should not make the error of Joseph Ratzinger in viewing Marxism as scientific in approach for it does not and cannot apply satisfactory tests of belief. In his 1996 address "RELATIVISM: THE CENTRAL PROBLEM FOR FAITH TODAY" he then entangles a false view of science and its applicability with a faith in cultural truths. Despite the fact that we need no absolute it is clear that we still need to exercise a more restrained, circumscribed and provisional 'faith' in ideas that are logically grounded in disciplined and systematic observation rather than value ideas that emerge from baseless cultural narratives. We should not however deny the motivational value of a provisional faith based on such observations. For the relativist it is a provisional faith or disbelief that will drive us to investigate alternatives. In so doing we do not expect to come upon an absolute and indeed would have no mechanism to recognize absolute descriptive truth should we stumble upon it. We should be wary of all claims to certainty and truth.

We can instead look at the rise of science and value its explanatory power and the utility of its derivative technologies without being unduly concerned about its truthfulness. Where possible we should strive to merge analytical philosophy with science to produce a more meaningful construct of the world. We need of course to decide in which domains of explanatory competence 'scientific methods' apply and not be afraid that we will discover logical inconsistency when we examine its most basic assumptions. Additionally we cannot expect these methods to provide us with a reason for living or a justification for our actions. Indeed it would be foolish to do so. Nevertheless the empirical tradition which the scientific method now embodies has been so successful in a practical sense that we should be prepared to apply the same rigour in examining the evidence for our faith in other aspects of our thinking where that is both possible and satisfying. By applying the disciplined style of thinking inherent in natural science we should be motivated by the idea that the debate can be raised to a higher and more productive plane from a utilitarian perspective. As we do so, we will continue to watch the scope for groundless religious and metaphysical speculation shrink. For example, almost no one today worships the sun in western cultures despite the fact that physics has taught us about its awesome size and energy output and its crucial importance to life on earth. It no longer seems appropriate to worship a ball of gas and its nuclear fusion reactions. Our cultural truths or necessities have moved on to a potentially more productive plane.

When we find ourselves in situations that are new for us but that are likely to recur in life we can attempt to adopt 2 strategies. We might ask what is the cultural norm and then find out how others proceed. Alternatively we can attempt to test the evidence, by expanding our education, carrying out investigation or engaging in logical reasoning. In so doing we may learn the value and satisfaction of producing novel ideas. We might then be on a more solid footing to share those ideas with our communities of communal interest. We can even have a limited sense of purpose through forming ideas that help us understand the world.

Adherents to many political, social, legal and religious creeds sometimes act however as if they know privileged truths that remain hidden from the rest of humanity. Even scientists can forget that they are merely creating a theoretical construct of the world with the aid of observation, experiment and prediction. The importance of an idea lies in its utility and the satisfaction that we derive from it rather than its logical or observational truth or logos.

Could There be Some Harm Involved in Rejecting Outmoded Cultural Truths ?

It would be foolish to argue that changing what people regard as 'true' in a culture could not result in some form of harm to the individuals or the societies concerned. If we act in an unduly conservative fashion however it is possible that we end by attempting to defend the otherwise indefensible and preserve the most outlandish and redundant of ideas.

Our societies are in any case in constant flux and it is not simply a matter of rejecting one set of ideas once and for all. New ideas constantly emerge. We should engage in an enquiring way of thinking and see the questioning of cultural truths as a necessity that facilitates cultural change, development and regeneration.

Rejection of Cultural Truth 'Norms'

Can we reject the abstract 'truths' that our culture and learning have imposed upon us? Perhaps we might be accused of nihilism or a destructive form of anarchism if we do so. If we fail to challenge the values of our culture however we are condemned to accept the historically accumulated baggage of ideas that surround us. We can certainly try to be free of the most outmoded ideas that we are presented with. As relativists it is part of our task to identify absolutes when they present themselves.

Consider the following list of challenging propositions related to abstract 'truths' in a definitive or absolute sense that pervade western culture today. Ask yourself whether or not the following list of 'truth' propositions are any more unreasonable than that adhered to by religious or political 'believers'. What do we in reality loose by adopting some of the ideas listed below? Remember also that in past times, when religious ideas had enormous political influence, I might have been ostracized, tortured or even murdered for writing this list.

There can be no definitive and final philosophical system or method of analysis

Science and philosophy can not develop a comprehensive, completely consistent and fully integrated 'theory of everything' and will remain, like mathematics, logically incomplete ( see Gödel's incompleteness theorems )

Faith in the unknowable, although motivational at times in science, religion and politics, is otherwise valueless. (This is distinct from the logical positivist or verificationist view that "if something cannot be empirically verified, it is meaningless")

There is no ultimate political correctness although we can make political progress at times

If you see the above list as black, why not try to see them more as a liberation from cultural norms and the baggage of political, religious, and cultural narratives. If you consider any of the above propositions to be true would you require some degree of faith by one of the definitions used on this site to hold to that truth? (click here for varied definitions of faith).

What ideas should not be denied ?

Most of us could devise a long list of abstract and concrete or practical philosophical ideas that might seem from our own cultural perspective to be true enough for us to act upon and still not invoke any of the ideas dismissed above.

Is there anything of value left after discarding outmoded cultural truths?

Oh yes! There is 'the good' (or satisfactory) life in its many senses, if we are fortunate to experience it. We should give very serious consideration to the concept of the good or satisfactory life in a biological, medical, psychological, social, legal, educational, intellectual, emotional, moral and materialistic sense. We can adopt this approach and still discard many of the cultural truths that are instilled into us by families, by education, by laws, by religions and political creeds.

After we adopt a scheme of ethics and meta-ethics the 'good or satisfactory life' becomes one of the most important concepts in a pragmatic approach to philosophy. The concept of 'the good life' has a respectable pedigree in the list of important ideas that we should consider. We should place emphasis on living a satisfactory life rather than seek absolutes of purpose, meaning or understanding. Those interested in these ideas might like to go to the reference page for the third "Beyond Belief" conference on the philosophy references page.

A youthful response to this page

My 12 year old son responded to the list of statements above, by describing them as "the dark truths". I hope those of more mature years can see beyond that way of thinking.