contact@onbelief.orgReader Responses Page 6
Eric: In engineering it is not usually possible to test large constructions directly. It is therefore necessary to have a belief that the design method, based on the known properties of individual components is valid and that the original testing to establish the properties of the components was correctly carried out and interpreted. This belief in the design method is not usually based on the hope that the method correctly provides an accurate analysis of stresses and strains in every part of the construction, it rarely does. But upon the track record of the method. If many similar constructions have been based on the same method and have proved to be successful it seems reasonable to conclude that the method is valid. Problems may arise of course if the construction is novel or the method and/or data are incorrectly applied. Likewise the basic testing of materials or components may not accurately represent service conditions. But if the test method has provenance as being able to predict accurately performance in service. It is usual to accept this in the belief that satisfactory past experience is a reasonable guide to future performance. I hope that this is of interest.
Commentary: It is extremely interesting to receive another response from somebody with an engineering perspective on belief. It would seem from what the respondent has said that we should consider design and mathematical modeling modeling in engineering as a pragmatic predictive belief system. Interestingly this engineer also points to the necessity for belief testing, in relation to the materials, component parts and overall design. I think it is fair to say that this response supports the views put forward on the page entitled The value of certainty, testability, verification and falsification. It would seem that our predictive knowledge is largely the sum of our verifications rather than the sum of our refutations.
Jonathan: 1) I enjoyed the web site but there may be a bit more to Popper than you gave [credit]: falsifiability is a far more substantial test of a theory than looking for supporting evidence (that is always there - it is why the theory is worth having). Experiments that test predictions provide a good measure of a theory but, as Quine (I think) pointed out: theories have many legs and, when a theory apparently fails, it is not obviously clear as to which of the legs is weak.
2) As to the laws of biology: 1: Nothing makes sense in biology except within the context of evolution 2: The choice that cells make in development depends on whether its history or its neighbours shouts louder.
Commentary 1) I have to disagree with you on more general grounds concerned with the philosophy of science. It would appear as you say that falsification is a more powerful test because one failure would appear to outweigh numerous verifying tests. In more general terms however this concept, is only worth considering if you view science to be the the pursuit of logical, abstract or inalienable truth. I have argued that progress is rarely if ever achieved purely by refutation alone. When experimental evidence appears to refute a belief, it becomes more useful when that same evidence is used in support of a new or alternative explanatory theory. The power of science does not lie in is truthfulness, (P= 1 or 0 in a mathematical sense), but in the comprehensiveness and coherence of description and the utility of its predictive capacity integrated over a probability distribution. Falsification is concerned with p=0 and is merely one logical end of a probability distribution with respect to the descriptive or predictive capacity of a theory.
If what you argue were correct it would be legitimate for scientists to pursue careers that were centred equally around the refutation of theory as well as its advancement. If refutation were ever to be seen as a more powerful activity in research, natural sciences would then become as useless as metaphysics. I think the average university research centre in the natural sciences would last less than 5 years if that were to be the case.
I have also argued that scientific theories are only valuable, in a utilitarian and conceptual sense, within their domains of predictive competence. The central dogma of molecular biology for example has nothing to say about earthquakes or star collapse and vice versa. At some point in the not too distant future I will write more concerning a general theory of science as domains of predictive competence. For the moment I wish to re-iterate a very important point; that science does not have predictive competence in issues of morality. Science although predictively powerful cannot produce a complete definition of the human condition.
2) I agree that evolutionary theory is the cornerstone of biology (as distinct from biochemistry). Your comment about cell identity in the context of (embryological) development is very thought provoking. Clearly in view of the first point about evolution we should put the 2 ideas together. To be more explicit, should we view the multi-cellular organism as an entity in which there is an element of competitive struggle for phenotypic dominance? Clear in more recent human evolutionary times neurons have been 'winning' that 'struggle' over osteoblasts (bone-forming cells) and myoblasts (muscle-forming cells). Present demographics suggest that adipocytes (fat cells) are doing a pretty good job too. Perhaps the future will see a secure existence for more evolved more multi-functional adipocytes.
Jim: For me faith has nothing to do with certainty. Faith is belief in the presence of uncertainty.
Commentary: Thank you for this thought. In view of your response I have acknowledged that faith means different things to different people and have therefore offered a range of definitions on the page concerned with faith (click here >)
David: (has responed to my correspondence concerning this site by saying) "It is correct to say that I am attempting to justify religious beliefs and practices partly on pragmatic grounds. Although I would not wish to reduce the former to the latter, I take utility and fruitfulness to be important marks of religious truth - 'by their fruits ye shall know them'.
Response : I accept this biblical quotation is indeed a very useful precept which non-christians should give very serious consideration to. I would suggest that your are arguing for one form of pragmatic test of belief. I find it ironic and even encouraging that as a theologian you feel this pragmatic way of thinking involving a test of belief can be of value.
Damian: ...... I wonder whether you are familiar with the ideas of Neurolinguistic Programming (NLP)? One of the underlying tenets is that NLP does not seek 'what is true?', but explores 'what is useful?'. You may enjoy reading about how NLP developed this idea, and how it uses the 'logical levels' idea to consider the individual, their beliefs and identity.
When reading your site, and your comments about the relationship between belief, truth and leading a moral life, I remembered from Descartes' original work that although he spent much time exploring how we can know truth, with regard to his own life he believed that he should act "as if" something is true, if he had reason to think it likely. So the existence of god being 'true' or 'false', is distinct from whether someone believes in it or not; and both truth and belief are distinct from trying to lead a moral life based on principles flowing from religious tradition. Of course, it is equally possible to base one's views on a humanistic tradition which totally rejects theism. Thanks again for giving me the opportunity of revisiting these ideas.
Commentary: I agree that a pragmatic view of belief is more desirable than any form of absolutism. It strikes me that beliefs which require excessively 'fuzzy' logic however are not helpful and can even border on the delusional. Reliance on delusions once they become established in the mind can be very unproductive and result in much unhappiness and wasted effort.
Acting "as if" an idea is true is absolutely essential to human existence, the pursuit of science and the advancement technology. I also agree that beliefs and the existence of things are not the same.
Clearly the morality embedded in our laws, social practice and wider culture are very much tied up with our history, which for many societies means a strong and ongoing religious influence. Morality learned through the frequent repetition of religious narratives can of course produce a valuable personal outlook. It can even produce a sense of wellbeing and lead to cohesive social behaviour associated with the evolving reproductive fitness within a particular community. Nevertheless, are we not capable of developing a philosophical and moral education system within our society that does not require superstition or involve the politics and indoctrination of religion? Can our moral codes not be viewed as our most valuable cultural artifacts and so be cherished by our clearest thinking?
On the Nature of Belief
www.onbelief.org
Scotland, 12th October 2007 and thereafter
Copyright 2007 onwards
