contact@onbelief.orgReader Responses: Page 8
Kevin: I read your various articles on belief; I thought they were cogent and clearly argued, but I can't say I agree with everything you say. I suspect I am of much the same mind as you regarding matters of religion and science, and I'm always wary of being too easy to accept an argument that happens to come to conclusions that I already tend to agree with :)
Most significantly, it seems to me that you're advocating a form of logical positivism, perhaps slightly tempered by a willingness to accept non-provable assertions based on their utility. I hope I haven't misrepresented you too badly. The problem is that you have the same problems that the original positivists have, plus a few extra ones. Most significantly, even if you're prepared to accept the primacy of observational information over any other kind -- and that in itself is something that requires justification -- you've still got to contend with the fact (observation?) that individual observational powers are actually very limited.
For example I, personally, have no means to make observations to test the validity of either Darwinian evolution, or six-day creationism. I wouldn't begin to know how to do this, and I suspect that 99.999% of other people wouldn't, either. If human society as a whole is to prosper, then there has to be some willingness for one generation of people to put its trust in the assertions made by previous generations. Ultimately, it is our willingness to do this that means we aren't all
living in caves still.
That leaves us with the basic epistemic issue: who do we trust, and why? I've thought about this a lot over the years, and I have to say that I've been unable to come up with any a priori reason to trust a scientific statement than one that comes from religious revelation, for example.
Consider this rather trivial example: suppose I need to know the mass of an electron. I don't know it, or have any idea how to measure it. So I ask the fellow in the lab next door, and he tells me that it's in some book of data tables he has. Apparently the values in those tables are arrived at by measurement, but we don't know who did the measurement, or when. I also ask my priest, who says that an angel appeared to him and told him the mass of an electron is whatever-it-is.
Given a choice between these two sources of authority, my natural inclination would be to trust the data tables than the priest. But I have absolutely no a priori justification for doing so. I have no rational grounds for such a decision.
If you're a scientist, you'd probably argue that the mass of the electron in the data table is at least testable in principle , while the angel isn't. But is a wholly notional idea of testability -- one that could never be exercised in practice -- good grounds for accepting information? I rather doubt that it is.
The more I think about it, the more I think that the reason I prefer scientific explanations to religious ones, for the most part, is that science is more useful; this is an a posteriori argument -- an argument from results. Which is fine so far as it goes, so long as we all agree on what a `good' result it. And we don't. It also leaves us at risk of somebody, someday producing better results by religious thinking. Suppose, on balance, a belief in the effectiveness of homeopathy leads people to enjoy happier, more fulfilled lives than a belief in antibiotics -- should we abandon the atom theory of matter? Surely not -- but why not?
In short, I am somewhat sceptical about making a mantra of empiricism -- it is surprisingly difficult to find a strong philosophical justification for it. Or so it seems to me. Best wishes.
Commentary: Interesting thoughts, many thanks.
Since I would have no beliefs or ideas if I did not make observations, I do not feel that I need to justify the primacy of observation. I regard that as axiomatic.
I take it for granted that observation can give rise to conflicting ideas. I see no need for absolute truth or an absolute frame of reference from which I can judge any idea. Extending that thought further, I therefore see no need for an absolutist basis in assessing the methods of coming to a particular judgment. I have argued on other pages we need to look to the coherence and testability of ideas without invoking an asymmetry between verification and falsification. As one additional criterion I believe we should look to the economy of a belief. However I accept that the principle of economy involved in empiricism, black-box thinking and the limitation of reductionist investigation almost inevitably will result in oversimplification. Having abandoned certainty for strength of belief I can only look to utility and emotional satisfaction from my simplistic analysis.
In your example I have no problem in looking to the data table rather than a priest because I believe that he has no means at his disposable to make observations of any utility with respect to the mass of an electron other than consult the same data table as me. I have no problem with the subjectivity of that belief for I accept that all understanding of probability has a subjective basis. For purely empirical reasons I would be more inclined to accept the religiously inspired humanism of a priest than a scientist for I accept that in the course of his pastoral work he might have had exposure to the human condition in a way that enriches his thinking and might have contemplated ideas of moral relevance in his study. My only interest in this regard is the utility of his ideas and the emotional impact of them on me.
I am quite content for and idea to be partially true and accept that most of what I believe at present will, in future, be thought of as nonsense.
I accept that there are difficulties in defining 'goodness'. However I have no wish to be absolute in my thinking and so am not motivated to reach a definitive understanding of goodness either in the sense of experimantal precision, validity of explanations or in the sense of moral rectitude.
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I am happy to discuss the ideas expressed on this site with religious and non-religious people alike. However despite my contentious remarks about religion, I no longer see any personal value in debating the correctness of particular details of the many theologies that exist with the religious or 'non-believers' and do not obtain any satisfaction from doing so. Perhaps you could direct such comments to a 'believer', priest, minster of religion, theologian, philosopher, atheist or skeptical thinker as you think appropriate. I hope you will not see that request as arrogance on my part but merely as a desire to move on to other areas of debate, which at this time in my life, I view as more productive. If you have been personally insulted by what I have written you have my sincere apologies for I seek to challenge rather than insult. I can say very little to those who see all challenges to their beliefs as an insult, especially if those challenges come in the form of newspaper cartoons. Otherwise your comment is very welcome.
On the Nature of Belief
www.onbelief.org
Scotland, 12th October 2007 and thereafter
Copyright 2007 onwards
